There are two ways to fight the United States military:
There are two ways to fight the United States military: asymmetrically and stupid. Asymmetrically means you're going to try to avoid our strengths. In the 1991 Gulf War, it's like we called Saddam's army out into the schoolyard and beat up that army.
The words of H. R. McMaster — “There are two ways to fight the United States military: asymmetrically and stupid. Asymmetrically means you're going to try to avoid our strengths. In the 1991 Gulf War, it's like we called Saddam's army out into the schoolyard and beat up that army.” — are spoken with the clarity of a soldier who has studied both history and battle firsthand. His words reveal not only the unmatched strength of the American military, but also the folly of those who would challenge it head-on. He reminds us that war is not only about courage, but about wisdom, and that to ignore the power of one’s enemy is to embrace destruction.
To call one path “asymmetric” and the other “stupid” is to divide the strategies of war into wisdom and folly. Asymmetry means cunning — the art of the weak confronting the strong by avoiding the fields where the strong are invincible. It is the guerrilla ambush in the jungle, the hidden bomb on the roadside, the strike upon supply lines rather than the clash of armies in open fields. This has always been the weapon of the smaller force: to avoid the hammer by slipping between its blows. But to confront a superior enemy on his chosen ground, with his chosen weapons, is not bravery — it is recklessness, and it leads only to ruin.
The 1991 Gulf War is McMaster’s chosen example. Saddam Hussein’s army, vast in number but ill-prepared and poorly led, sought to stand in the open desert against the United States and its coalition allies. There, under the wide skies of Kuwait and Iraq, American air power, armored divisions, and precision weaponry obliterated them. It was not a contest of equals, but a slaughter. McMaster likens it to a schoolyard beating, for the Iraqi army was drawn into a fight it could not possibly win, standing face to face with an opponent whose strength dwarfed it. This was not courage; it was strategic blindness.
History echoes with such lessons. The Athenians at Marathon did not confront the Persians with greater numbers, but with cunning, attacking from the flanks. The Viet Cong in the Vietnam War did not line up against American tanks, but hid in jungles, tunnels, and villages, striking where the mighty could not bring their full strength to bear. These are the ways of asymmetry, the only path for the weaker to resist the stronger. To ignore such wisdom, as Saddam did, is to invite swift annihilation.
McMaster’s words are also a reminder of the nature of power itself. Strength is not only a shield but a snare, for it tempts opponents to test it and tempts the strong to underestimate the cunning of the weak. The United States, with unmatched military might, may crush conventional armies easily — but asymmetry is the eternal answer of those who cannot hope to match fire with fire. Thus, he warns not only the enemies of America, but also America itself: beware the cunning, for they will never challenge you where you are strongest.
The lesson for us in daily life is no different. When confronted with challenges, do not always rush into direct conflict where the odds are against you. Choose instead the path of wisdom over pride, of strategy over rashness. To meet an opponent head-on where they are strongest is folly; but to study their weaknesses, to maneuver around their power, is the way of victory. Whether in war, in debate, in business, or in personal struggle, the principle of asymmetry is the shield of the wise.
What, then, must we do? Learn to see with clarity where true strength lies — both our own and that of others. Resist the pride that drives men to reckless battles. Train ourselves not only in courage, but in cunning. And when conflict cannot be avoided, fight with wisdom, choosing the ground, the moment, and the method that favor victory. For as McMaster reminds us, the difference between survival and destruction is not only valor, but strategy.
Thus let his words be remembered as both warning and guide: there are two ways to fight — asymmetrically and stupid. Choose always the first, for the second is the path of ruin. And let this wisdom guide not only armies, but every soul that seeks victory in the struggles of life.
LNLinh Nguyen
H. R. McMaster’s reference to the Gulf War as a ‘schoolyard beat-up’ paints a grim picture of military dominance. But does such a statement reduce the complexity of modern warfare to a simplistic view of overpowering strength? Is war always about strength, or is it about strategy and adaptation? Asymmetrical warfare shows that the real power may not always lie in the biggest army but in outsmarting the opponent.
TTPhan Nguyen Thanh Thuy
McMaster’s words shed light on the stark difference in military capabilities between the U.S. and its opponents, especially in conventional warfare. But does this make the U.S. military’s victory in the Gulf War a fair one, or does it highlight the disparity between superpowers and smaller nations? In an increasingly interconnected world, how can we address the growing gap between advanced and asymmetrical warfare without escalating violence?
TLMinh Uyen Tran Lam
McMaster’s quote about the Gulf War reinforces the idea of military superiority through sheer strength. However, it also raises ethical concerns about the nature of power in warfare. If you fight asymmetrically, it implies that the opponent cannot win in a fair fight, but instead must rely on unconventional methods. Is this a fair approach to war, or does it undermine the very concept of just war and human dignity in conflict?
T8NGUYEN THI THANH TRUC 8a
McMaster’s view of the 1991 Gulf War as a ‘beat-up’ situation for Saddam’s army highlights how a conventional army might have little chance against the power of the U.S. military. However, does this approach leave room for the evolving nature of warfare, such as cyberattacks, guerrilla tactics, and other forms of asymmetric strategies? How do these modern tactics challenge the U.S. military’s dominance and create new dynamics in warfare?
HTNguyen Thi Hoang Trinh
McMaster’s statement reflects the overwhelming dominance of the U.S. military in conventional warfare, as shown in the 1991 Gulf War. The term ‘stupid’ in the context of fighting against the U.S. suggests that any attempt to engage in a direct, conventional fight is bound to fail. Is this a fair assessment, or does it ignore the complexities of asymmetrical warfare, where the weaknesses of a military superpower can still be exploited in creative ways?