Bernard Williams

Dive into the life and work of Sir Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (1929–2003), one of the 20th century’s most influential moral philosophers. Explore his critique of ethical theory, his ideas about moral luck, internal reasons, truth, and how his work reshaped the study of ethics.

Introduction

Sir Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (September 21, 1929 – June 10, 2003) was an English moral philosopher whose work challenged much of mainstream analytic ethics and sought to bring moral philosophy closer to the complexity of human life. Rather than proposing a grand systematic theory, he emphasized the limits of theoretical ethics and the importance of history, culture, psychology, and contingency in moral thought. His major works include Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), Shame and Necessity (1993), Truth and Truthfulness (2002), and earlier essays collected in Moral Luck (1981). He was knighted in 1999 for his contributions to philosophy.

In what follows, we trace his life, key ideas, criticisms, and lasting impact.

Early Life and Academic Path

Bernard Williams was born in Westcliff-on-Sea, Essex, England on September 21, 1929. His parents were Hilda Amy Williams (née Day) and Owen Pasley Denny Williams, who worked for the Ministry of Works. He was educated at Chigwell School before winning a scholarship to Oxford University (Balliol College), where he read “Greats” — a classical programme combining ancient philosophy, history, and literature.

In the early 1950s, Williams served in the Royal Air Force (1951–53). Later, he held fellowships at All Souls College, Oxford, and taught at several institutions including University College London, Bedford College (London), and New College, Oxford.

In 1967, he was appointed the Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge and also became a fellow of King’s College. He later served as Provost of King’s (1979–1987).

In 1988, Williams moved to the United States, accepting the Deutsch (Monroe Deutsch) Professorship at UC Berkeley. Then, in 1990, he returned to Oxford to serve as White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy and a fellow of Corpus Christi. He continued to publish and teach until his death on June 10, 2003, in Rome, Italy, of heart failure.

Intellectual Project & Philosophical Style

One of the hallmarks of Williams’s approach is his skepticism toward grand, all-encompassing moral systems. He worried that ethical theories (such as utilitarianism or Kantianism) tend to oversimplify the richness of moral life — glossing over tensions, personal commitments, emotions, history, and contingencies. He urged philosophy to remain more human in tone: attentive to psychology, culture, history, and the uniqueness of persons.

Colin McGinn once described him as “an analytical philosopher with the soul of a general humanist.” Martha Nussbaum said he demanded that philosophy “come to terms with, and contain, the difficulty and complexity of human life.”

Williams’s essays are often polemical, critical, non-systematic, and careful to preserve nuance over abstraction.

Key Philosophical Contributions

Below is a summary of his central ideas.

Moral Luck

One of Williams’s most famous contributions is the notion of moral luck: the idea that factors beyond our control (so-called “luck”) influence moral assessment of our actions — yet we commonly treat agents as fully responsible. For example, two people might perform the same action, but one’s circumstances (due to chance) lead to far worse consequences; we tend to judge one more harshly, even though much was out of their control. Williams used this and related thought experiments to show how our ordinary moral judgments can’t be neatly captured by rigid theories.

Internal vs. External Reasons

Williams argued that reasons for action must originate internally — i.e. to act, one must already have some desire or inclination that the action would serve. He was critical of the idea of external reasons (i.e. reasons that apply to you regardless of your motivating desires) when these are detached from one’s psychological makeup. This view implies that moral demands must be connected to the agent’s motivational structure, and cannot simply be imposed externally in a vacuum.

Critique of Utilitarianism and Kant

Williams was a trenchant critic of utilitarianism and Kantian deontology.

• Against utilitarianism: he argued that it flattens moral life by focusing on outcomes and aggregations of welfare, ignoring subtleties of character, intentions, integrity, and personal projects.

• Against Kantianism: he challenged the abstraction and universalism of Kantian ethics, and argued that they can disconnect morality from practical human concerns.

Integrity, Identity & Authenticity

Williams emphasized personal integrity — that moral agents must maintain coherence between their values, commitments, and actions. He held that one’s identity and projects matter: we are not blank slates, and moral demands must negotiate with who we already are. His skepticism toward theory was partly rooted in the view that morality cannot subsume or override deeply held personal attachments.

Truth, Truthfulness, and Genealogy

In his later work, especially Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (2002), Williams explored how the concept of truth is both philosophically fraught and ethically central. He approached truth genealogically (following Nietzschean inspiration) — investigating how truth, sincerity, and accuracy are values shaped by history, power, and human institutions. He defended certain values of truth (like accuracy and sincerity) while acknowledging that the ideal of pure objectivity is problematic.

The Limits of Objectivity

Williams often critiqued the possibility of a fully objective standpoint in ethics or knowledge, arguing that human perspectives, contexts, history, and contingency always intrude. He was wary of “the absolute conception” (the ideal of a standpoint outside all partiality), especially in ethical and moral claims.

Selected Works

Here is a brief list of some of Bernard Williams’s major writings and their themes: