Thomas Nagel

Thomas Nagel – Life, Philosophy, and Memorable Reflections

Explore the life, philosophical contributions, and notable insights of Thomas Nagel. Delve into his work on the mind, ethics, objectivity, and the tension between subjective and objective viewpoints.

Introduction

Thomas Nagel (born July 4, 1937 in Belgrade, then Yugoslavia) is an influential philosopher whose work spans philosophy of mind, ethics, political theory, and metaphysics.

Though born in Yugoslavia, Nagel has been regarded as an American philosopher, having lived and worked in the U.S. for most of his life.

He is best known for raising deep puzzles about consciousness, subjectivity, and moral reasoning—especially his challenge to purely reductionist, physicalist accounts of mind, and his attempts to mediate between subjective experience and objective reason.

This article tells the story of Nagel’s life and then explores his philosophical legacy, key ideas, and memorable reflections.

Early Life and Family

Thomas Nagel was born on July 4, 1937, in Belgrade, then part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (today Serbia).

His parents were German Jewish refugees (Walter Nagel and Carolyn [née] Nagel).

When he was quite young (in 1939), his family emigrated to the United States, seeking refuge from the disturbances in Europe.

Nagel grew up in and around New York and later became a naturalized U.S. citizen (in 1944) by virtue of residence and legal processes.

He did not have a formal religious upbringing; he identifies culturally in relation to his Jewish heritage, but philosophically he has described himself as an atheist.

Education and Academic Path

Undergraduate & Early Studies

• Nagel completed his B.A. in Philosophy at Cornell University in 1958.

• He then went to Oxford University on a Fulbright (or similar fellowship), earning a BPhil in philosophy in 1960, under the influence of figures like J. L. Austin and Paul Grice.

• He returned to the U.S. for doctoral study, earning a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Harvard University in 1963. His doctoral advisor was John Rawls.

Academic Appointments

• After obtaining his Ph.D., Nagel began teaching at the University of California, Berkeley (circa 1963–66).

• He then moved to Princeton University, from 1966 until 1980, where he taught and influenced many younger philosophers.

• In 1980, he joined New York University (NYU) as University Professor of Philosophy and Law, a position he held until retiring (emeritus) around 2016.

• During his career, he was also affiliated with Princeton and held visiting positions and fellowships.

Nagel has supervised or influenced many well-known philosophers, including Susan Wolf, Shelly Kagan, Samuel Scheffler, Rebecca Goldstein, and others.

Philosophical Contributions and Ideas

Thomas Nagel’s influence is wide, touching multiple subfields. The core tension in his work is how to reconcile subjective experience with objective, detached reasoning. Below are some of his major contributions and recurring themes.

Philosophy of Mind & Consciousness

One of Nagel’s most famous contributions is the essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” (1974).

• In that work, Nagel argues that even if we knew all the objective, physical facts about a bat’s brain and behavior, we would still not know what it's like to be the bat — the subjective, first-person experience (the "qualia") remains inaccessible to a purely objective account.

• This argument is often taken to be a classic criticism of reductionist physicalism or materialism: mind resists full capture by physical descriptions.

More broadly, Nagel argues that:

• Consciousness has an irreducible subjective aspect.

• The “view from nowhere” — the attempt to adopt a completely neutral, detached, objective perspective — is useful in science, but it cannot fully account for subjective experience.

• He suggests that any adequate philosophy of nature must somehow accommodate both subjective and objective perspectives, a project he pursues more fully in later work (e.g. Mind and Cosmos).

• In Mind and Cosmos (2012), he critiques the standard neo-Darwinian account of life and consciousness, arguing that purely mechanistic explanations are likely incomplete. While he rejects intelligent design as traditionally conceived, he suggests that some new, more expansive view of natural teleology may be required.

Because of these views, Nagel is sometimes associated with panpsychism (the idea that mind or proto­mental properties are ubiquitous), or at least with versions of cosmic or nonreductive realism.

Ethics, Moral Reasoning & Altruism

Nagel has also contributed significantly to ethics, especially moral motivation, the structure of reasons, and how objective and subjective perspectives intersect.

• His early work, The Possibility of Altruism (1970), explores how moral reasoning and practical reasoning relate. He defends a “motivated desire” theory: when a person judges a moral claim, that judgment inherently motivates them, tying belief and reason to desire in a subtle way.

• He distinguishes agent-relative (or subjective) reasons from agent-neutral (objective) reasons, and often explores how they must be balanced.

• In The View from Nowhere (1986), Nagel more systematically explores the tension between subjective and objective viewpoints—not just in thought but in ethics, identity, and our conception of reason.

• He has also written on political philosophy, justice, and partiality vs equality (e.g. Equality and Partiality), critiquing and extending liberal theories (especially those of John Rawls) from a perspective that gives weight to both subjective commitments and objective demands.

Nagel finds in moral philosophy a domain where the tensions between personal perspective and impersonal principle are especially acute.

Objectivity, Rationalism, and the Limits of Reductionism

A recurring theme in Nagel’s work is skepticism (not of everything, but of naive reductionism) about the dominance of the purely objective perspective.

• He argues that the scientific worldview, though powerful, is only one vantage point, and it may systematically omit or distort aspects of experience (especially those tied to subjectivity).

• He criticizes philosophical currents that treat subjectivity as inferior or illusory, and warns against making the objectifying viewpoint the only one that “counts.”

• In metaphysics, Nagel is open to the possibility that new, radical conceptual expansions will be needed to integrate mentality and nature.

• He also defends what might be called a realist pluralism: accepting that different kinds of explanations or viewpoints may be irreducible to one another.

Nagel’s style is often to bring philosophical problems back to living human experience — to remind philosophers that their theories must reckon with what it feels like to be us.

Legacy, Influence & Recognition

Thomas Nagel’s work has left a lasting imprint:

• His “what it is like” argument remains a cornerstone in philosophy of mind debates.

• He has inspired philosophers working on consciousness, qualia, and the hard problem of mind (e.g. David Chalmers, Galen Strawson).

• In ethics and political philosophy, his melding of personal perspective and impartial reason continues to be invoked in debates about moral realism, partiality, and justice.

• His insistence on conceptual humility—the idea that our deepest theories might always leave something out—has influenced more modest or pluralist philosophical approaches.

• He writes in a relatively clear, nontechnical style, making certain of his works (like The View from Nowhere, Mortal Questions) accessible to educated, non-specialist readers.

• Over his career, he has been honored with awards such as the Balzan Prize and Rolf Schock Prize (both in 2008).

• He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, a corresponding fellow of the British Academy, and a member of the American Philosophical Society.

Though he sometimes draws criticism—especially for his more controversial views in Mind and Cosmos—he remains one of the most serious and thoughtful interlocutors in contemporary analytic philosophy.

Notable Lines & Reflections

While Nagel is not primarily known for pithy maxims, several passages from his essays stand out as expressive and provocative:

• On subjective experience:

  “An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism.” (from What Is It Like to Be a Bat?)

• On life’s value:

  “There are elements which, if added to one’s experience, make life better; there are other elements which if added to one’s experience, make life worse. … But what remains when these are set aside is not merely neutral: it is emphatically positive.” (from his essay Death)

• On the relationship between objective and subjective points of view:

  He often characterizes philosophy’s task as trying to reconcile “the view from nowhere” (objective standpoint) with the “view from here” (subjective, first-person perspective). (This phrase recurs especially in The View from Nowhere)

• On moral reasons and reasoned action (in The Possibility of Altruism):

  Moral judgments inherently carry motivational force — when one sees a reason, one is (in a non-detached sense) moved by it. (paraphrase of his position)

These lines reveal how Nagel tries to bring philosophical reflection closer to lived human concerns: experience, perspective, moral agency, and meaning.

Lessons from Thomas Nagel

What can readers and thinkers take away from Nagel’s life and philosophy?

1. Respect the tension between subjectivity and objectivity.
   Nagel teaches us that human experience cannot be fully banished into detached theories; philosophy must inhabit both intimate and abstract spaces.

2. Beware of philosophical hubris.
   His work warns against the complacent assumption that science or reductionist methodology will answer every question.

3. Philosophy as a middle path.
   He seeks neither mythic mysticism nor brute materialism; he models a posture of critical inquiry that remains open, tentative, reflective.

4. Balance personal commitment and impartiality.
   His ethical reflections show that moral life involves mediating between our particular attachments and more universal demands.

5. Clarity matters.
   Despite the depth of his ideas, Nagel often writes in a readable manner, inviting partly non-specialized readers into serious debate.

Nagel’s intellectual humility, breadth of interest, and conviction that philosophy must stay in touch with human life make him an enduring figure in 20th–21st century thought.

Conclusion

Thomas Nagel stands as a philosopher deeply concerned with how we think, how we feel, and how we reason. His bridging of subjective experience and objective understanding offers one of the more sustained attempts to prevent philosophy from becoming either purely technical or merely poetic.

His work continues to animate debates over consciousness, ethics, and reason. Engaging with Nagel means grappling with the limits of our knowledge, the richness of lived experience, and the unfolding challenge of integrating these into a coherent worldview.